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I. INTRODUCTION
   Negotiation analysis mostly concentrates on face to face constellations 
between two or more negotiators whose emotions, competencies, visions, 
leadership, skills, personal styles, strategies etc. determine the outcome of the 
negotiation process. Notwithstanding the importance of such factors we want to 
concentrate in this contribution on the environmental factors which also 
determine the negotiation process ; such structure related factors are institutions 
in the broad sense of the term comprising assemblies, norms, rules, values, 
ideologies, cultures, symmetric or asymmetric constellations etc., hence all those 
factors which influence a negotiator's action besides his own personal qualities. 
   The model of analysis (see below) in its simple form concentrates on the 
relationship between the actor and his environment ; the outcome, then, depends 
on the particular shape this relationship takes and, more specifically, the 
outcome differs according to the different institutional settings. 
   Our empirical domain is the regime that has become the European Union 
(EU), with its communitarian and its intergovernmental institutions. The main 
hypothesis states that these two institutional patterns lead to different 
outcomes. In choosing the EU, we concentrate on its various bodies of decision-
making as the institutional core of negotiations. 
   Negotiations and decision-making' are central to pluralistic and represen-
tative democracies in a wide range of political bodies. Decisions in the political 
sense of the term are, in general, made by small groups for a greater community 
(Pfetsch 1995). In assemblies that function as organs of representation, decisions
1 In this contribution we use the terms negotiation and decision-making interchangably. The 
 term decision-making is a broader term in that it covers the outcomes of the negotiation pro-
 cess and in addition decisions brought about through voting and balloting. The outcome of ne-
 gotiations are decisions, but not all decisions are achieved through negotiations. The terms ne-
 gotiation process and decision-making process can be used synonymously.
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are reached through negotiation, voting or balloting ; the negotiation process 
leads to decisions but not all decisions are reached by negotiation. By studying 
the negotiation process we study at the same time one of the two or three 
decision-making processes. Their arena consists of various levels of private and 
public organizations of and among political institutions such as the different 
organs of the European Community. By choosing EU-institutions we restrict 
ourselves to elected political elites, selected administrators and representatives 
of private organizations. The public is itself not present but is represented, and 
is the subject of the various outcomes of negotiation-and decision-making 
processes. The legitimacy of the EU-institutions is questioned with decreasing 
acceptance-rates by the electorate in various member countries. By this the elite 
institutions are challenged and have to respond during their discussions at the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) for the reform of the EU. 
   In describing our empirical field which is the European Union ; (EU) with its 
predecessor organizations we proceed from the general to the specific. 
   As a general characteristic the EU with its supranational institutions (the 
Council, the Commission, the Parliament, the Court) is, compared to other 
international organizations, the most integrated form of international coopera-
tion ; other international organizations are intergovernmental by nature. The 
community institutions of the EU can make binding decisions with majority 
voting and they can sanction deviations from these decisions. In other inter-
national arenas, only the Security Council of the UN together with the Inter-
national Court of Justice are invested with these powers. But the EU with its 
European Council and its Council of Ministers is at the same time an inter-
governmental organ; thus the Community was from its beginning "a two-
track enterprise" (Pfetsch 1994: 120). With the 1992 treaty of the European 
Union these two methods of cooperation have become more differentiated : The 
so-called first pillar, which is mainly the single common market, is characterized 
by collective governance where the community institutions play an ever more 
important role. The second (Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP) and 
third (Justice and Home Affairs, JHA) pillars are intergovernmental by nature ; 
thus they are characterized by cooperation among and concertation with the 
individual governments as main actors. 
   The European Union has been characterized as a "negotiated democracy" 
(Scharpf) and negotiation is seen as the "predominant policy mode" (H. Wallace). 
Such a system embraces a multitude of heterogeneous actors with different 
policy styles and lobbying practices, bound together in overlapping networks, 
engaged in shifting coalitions, moving within and across the different levels of 
the EU-system (Kohler-Koch 1994). Negotiation theories normally underline
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the positive effects of cooperation in that it binds actors together in view of a 
common goal, in that actors can learn about the differences of interest, and in 
that they can steer intentionally their cooperation. With some resevations2, 
these positive effects of negotiations can be demonstrated. Negotiations within 
the EU are facilitated by the existence of a supranational institutional 
framework, which creates stable communications through repetitive games with 
the same players, facilitates the information flow, improves decision-making 
through the existence of stable procedures which make expectations more 
calculable, promotes the community spirit and stabilizes the implementation of 
decisions and, if necessary, sanctions deviations. It is this communitarian 
institutional framework which allows such positive effects. In the center of this 
institutional network are assemblies in which negotiations take place. They can 
take the form of committees, ad-hoc expert meetings, ministerial meetings, 
meetings of the commissioners, reunions of parliamentary bodies, conventions of 
the heads of executives etc. The "comitology" functions as a key instrument of 
negotiation and mediation. 
   Research on the conditions and explanations of the negotiation and decision-
making process has focused on a multitude of factors, concepts and approaches. 
The history of political thought has concentrated on external determinations of 
decisions, such as the materialistic determinism in Marx' tradition, or on internal 
conditioning, such as Schmitt's occasional "Dezionismus", Saint-Simon's posi-
tivism, Schelsky's concept of technical necessity (Sachgesetzlichkeit), Sorel's 
collective spontaneity, or Max Weber's poietic subjectivism. These mostly anti-
democratic positions do not match the reality of decision-making in the real 
world of representative democracies. Instead, we have to deal with multi-issue, 
multi-layered and often multi-cultural processes of interaction between actor(s) 
and environment(s) (Muller 1973: 48). 
   Here, we focus on an important part of the possible forms of "decision-
making and solution-finding" (Welsh 1973), that is collective decision-making in 
the EU-bodies since they are the most common decision-making institutions in 
representative democracies (Taylor 1975: 417). Giovanni Sartori has defined 
assemblies as durable and institutionalized small groups of three to thirty 
members (Sartori 1984: 93). They are in direct interaction and produce decisions 
continuously rather than occasionally. The assemblies we are studying in the
2 In some cases selfbinding of actors can complicate understanding ; see Genschel/Plumper : 
 Kommunikation and Kooperation in der internationalen Bankenregulierung 1996 (Conference 
 paper, Arnoldshain)
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 structure, 
institutions, 
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communitar-
ian institutions
intergovern-
  mental 
institutions
outcome outcome
Model for Analysis
EU-context mostly fit this definition. Thus, we take as the empirical base of 
negotiation processes the communitarian and the intergovernmental organs of 
the EU, i. e. the Council of Ministers and the European Council, together with the 
national bodies of the EU member states, as the main intergovernmental 
institutions, and the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the 
European Parliament as the main communitarian bodies. 
   This chapter identifies the determinants of the complex group-processes 
within the European Union, and explains the relations between decision-
production through negotiations and its conditions and consequences. What 
does negotiation-and decision-making theory tell us about the policies of the
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EU and in what way does it help understand and explain the very specific 
political process of the EU ? Are there any differences in the negotiation process 
between the community method of collective governance and the inter-
governmental method of cooperation between governments? This last question 
is in the center of our inquiry. 
   Analysis of decision-processes in assemblies has become a multi-
disciplinary enterprise. We draw from the findings of social psychology, 
sociology of organizations, political science, economics, mathematics, among 
others. We proceed with interrelated hypotheses which are tested in various 
contexts and which can reproduce the horizon of an integrative decision theory 
as an outcome of negotiations. From a theoretical point of view, assembly 
negotiations function as a pool of different interests of their members that 
should eventually lead to a common policy. A wide spectrum of voluntary or 
coercive procedures and techniques can lead to the aggregation of individual 
preferences for a collective decision : economically through market forces 
(through bargaining and exchange), or politically through consensus-producing 
processes (negotiating, voting). Power resources and their application play an 
important part in a process with multiple preferences. 
   Assembly-decisions are usually not reached by a single act. They are the 
result of complex processes and structures involving a multitude of persons and 
opinions. Pre-existing fixed interests are rarely the initiator of these processes 
according to a utility function. Instead, opinions and structured decisions are 
formulated during a dynamic trial and error process prior to the voting. It is in 
negotiations as a part of `preparatory' diplomacy or problem-counselling that 
the issue area is defined and decisions are prepared. The meeting in the lobby, 
the walk in the woods, the ground of golf, the dinner reception and other 
locations are such places where influence is manifest and approximation 
attempts are made or even solutions found. Formally, the decision-process takes 
place in a given framework, in which the decision-makers pursue their interests. 
They have instruments at hand which cause costs, risks or benefits. 
   Internal and external conditions, instruments, targets, costs/benefit 
considerations and the outcomes are five basic variables of a decision-process. 
In detail we deal with internal conditions such as: 
- size, 
- duration, 
- composition (organizational differentiation, political party composition), 
- representativity, 
- ideological or programmatic orientation and 
- the issues to be decided on.
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External conditions are: 
- binding and non-binding character of decisions, 
- pressure exerted on the negotiators, 
- future expectations of action and, foremost, 
-rules and procedures of decision-making. 
As instruments we deal with 
- use of power, influence and leadership, 
- coalition-forming, 
- setting of quotas and proportions, 
- enlargement or differentiation of subject-matters, 
- exchange or linkage, 
-delay through submission to committees or ratification, 
- escape into generalizations or ideologization. 
Outcome variables are: 
- non-decisions, 
- partial decisions, 
- radical decisions, 
-ambiguous decisions, 
- majority decisions, 
- stable decisions, 
- conservative or progressive decisions, 
- future oriented decisions. 
   These various variables of our analytical model are linked together 
hypotheses which are empirically tested with case studies from different 
empirical domains and illustrating examples. In such a way our analysis strives 
at middle range theories which help to explain the negotiation processes. 
   The underlying premises are twofold : on the one hand, more integration of 
European states leads to a more peaceful living together of the war-prone arena 
of Europe; on the other hand, a federal pattern of this regional system is the best 
way of securing diversity within unity. Hence, the often-quoted success story 
for which the EU stands can be measured by these two finalities. Other measures 
of success, however, must equally be considered such as people's welfare, 
democratic participation, human rights, the environmental protection, quality of 
life, etc.
II. FRAMEWORK
   We distinguish between internal and external conditions of negotiations in 
assemblies and between factors which can be influenced by the actors and those
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Institutions Matter: Negotiating the European Union
which cannot. Whereas the former distinction is in the center of the agent-
structure debate, the latter refers to the .distinction between objective and 
subjective factors of the negotiation process. Internal conditions are related to 
the assembly itself, and the external determinants stem from a broader set of 
norms derived from the political community as a whole. Pre-existing conditions 
or conditions that cannot be altered by the actors immediately determine the 
structure of the negotiation bodies. On each of these aspects we establish 
hypotheses which we later-on test with regard to the European Union.
III. STRUCTURES AND CONDITIONS
   We start studying the internal and external conditions of the 
process in groups.
negotiation
III. 1. The internal structure of assemblies 
   As to the internal structure, there are a variety of variables determining the 
stucture of assemblies like size, duration, composition (organizational differen-
tiation, political party composition), representativity, ideological or program-
matic orientation, and issues to be decided. 
III. 1. 1. The size of assemblies 
   The size of an assembly effects its structure as a working unit. Derived from 
organizational theory and empirical observations, we can establish a number of 
hypotheses : 
   HYPOTHESIS I : The bigger the assembly, the more it becomes organizationally 
differentiated (committees, sub-committees), 
   A day to day observation can illustrate this hypothesis. By inviting people 
for dinner and sitting around a table, one can observe that conversation among 
all the guests is possible as long as there are not more than about eight guests 
(see Olson 1971 : 52-55). If there are more than ten to fifteen (Pfetsch 1987), then 
the discussion takes place among three or four sitting each other. 
   We can test this hypothesis (see Thomas & Fink 1963) by studying the 
different EU-assemblies in course of the enlargement of the EC from six to nine, 
nine to 12 and finally 12 to 15 members. The more the Community expanded in 
scope and membership the more it became heterogeneous and negotiations more 
bounded by the circumspection of many participants (H. Wallace 1995: 33). 
   The plans of some governments at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) to reduce the number of commissioners and strengthening the Presidency 
of the Council is one strategy to overcome further differentiation and, as a 
consequence, inefficiency. With increasing numbers of actors there is also the
97
Frank R. Pfetsch
chance that more issues are put on the EC-agenda as compared to a national 
agenda (Cobb and Elder 1983). I. e. each enlargement brought new dimensions 
and areas of activity (see Granell 1995: 137). The first enlargement brought in 
a more democratic perspective and a new world dimension with its transatlantic 
relations. With the second enlargement new social and cohesive orientations 
were brought to bear with Latin American links. The third wave of enlargement 
emphasized environmental and social aspects and opened an outlook to Third 
World countries as well towards the East with expectations for the fourth round 
of enlargements. These expansions enlarged the policy issues, and, as noted by 
Peters, "the presence of alternatives is an important characteristic of agenda-
setting in the EC" (Peters 1994: 18). The more there are issues considered to be 
important, the more there is a necessity to find an organizational flame in the 
form of a Directorate General (DG), a committee or otherwise. Thus the com-
mittees of the European Parliament reflect the DGs in the Commission. 
   HYPOTHESIS II : The smaller the assembly, the higher the ballot's value or 
weight for each individual under unchanged voting procedures. 
   This hypothesis states only a numerical calculation : if there are only two 
voters then the weight of each is 1/2. If there are ten voters the weight of each 
is only 1/10. The smaller the unit of decision-making is, the more the 
preferences of the participants count (see Tullock 1971). 
   The search for securing equal representation and keeping the assemblies 
small is evident in the construction of various EU-organs. Qualified majority 
voting, as well as the introduction of the rotation system in the Council of 
Ministers, follows on these lines. The troika-solution enlarges the mandate of 
each country in the political process. Because of the fear by the bigger states of 
losing control of the decision-making bodies, the provision was introduced that 
one of the bigger countries must be represented and arguments were put 
forward in the IGC to restrain the scope and the authority of the community 
arenas. On the other hand, because of the fear of losing equal rights and weights, 
the smaller countries are against any concentration of office-holders in EU-
organs. 
   HYPOTHESIS III : The higher the number of participants is, the higher the costs 
of producing consensus (internal costs are), and the less the disadvantages for the 
individual voter (external risks) are. 
   The first statement refers to more or less organizational circumstances : the 
more participants there are, the more time is needed to produce consensus and, 
consequently, the more costly the production process of results is. Internal costs 
comprise such costs as bargaining and influence costs, implementation and 
monitoring costs, information costs, etc. (Cornett & Caporaso 1994: 226). As to
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the external risks (Sartori 1984: 85) there is a tendency that results produced by 
a small group of insiders leaving out important politicians and people who are 
affected by the decisions taken are not accepted and, consequently, do not last 
long (see Buchanan & Tullock 1962: 45). Amendments are the result of such 
restricted decision-making processes. 
   With more actors coming in, as in the enlargement of the EC/EU, the more 
diverting interests are being pursued. Each country brings in its own interests 
and wants them to be pursued. With an increase in number an assembly 
becomes more heterogenous and the windows of opportunities for agreements 
have become narrower (H. Wallace 1996: 33). Hence, with unanimity in impor-
tant policy fields, the time needed to achieve consensus increases. It can be said 
that the amount of time spent on discussions of issues increases with the 
increase of member countries in the EU. 
   Disadvantages for an individual actor would arise if he were victim of a 
"tyranny of the majority" (Alexis de Toqueville). This, however, rarely happens 
because of the voting rules expressed in the treaty and the voting practice in EU 
organs. As a rule, decisions are taken on a consensus basis even in cases where 
majority voting would be possible. It is part of the community spirit not to vote 
down a country by pushing through a decision with the majority rule. 
III. 1. 2. Duration 
   HYPOTHESIS IV: The less time is available, the easier it is in a system of 
majority voting for leading majorities to win. 
   Decisions taken under time pressure have a tendency to be pushed through 
by the majority party that does not take into account minority positions. The 
dictate of the majority prevails even if there is the political will to include 
minority positions. On the contrary, if there is no time-limit, the parties can seek 
consensus on a broader scale. 
   In the EU this hypothesis can only be tested in a selected number of policy 
fields, since unanimity is still required in the domain of high politics. As 
mentioned above even with majority voting the consensus principle is dominant 
in EU organs. It has to be seen if this hypothesis remains true in the future, when 
more majority voting is possible and where the advantage is with bigger 
countries that possess more weight in the Council ; in principle, no decision can 
be taken by smaller countries without the consent of the bigger ones. Also, as a 
principle and more in theory than in practice, there should be no discrimination 
of any one group-be it rich or poor, north or south, central or peripheral, 
agrarian or industrial, etc. 
III. 1. 3. Composition 
   HYPOTHESIS V : Subgroups within an assembly can, by forming coalitions 
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with others, reach a majority position and minimize the influence of an existing 
majority. Minorities can also benefit from a situation where two or more majority 
groups of equal size with opposing views counterbalance their weight and have to rely 
on the support of smaller parties. 
   Under certain conditions minorities get their chance. According to our 
hypothesis, small groups have either no influence at all or some influence taking 
into account their relative weight (see Moscovici et al 1969, Allan 1984). This 
can be the result of the behavior of the majority groups towards each other. If 
the bigger countries cannot agree on a particular issue, the smaller ones get their 
chance by joining the one or the other and vice versa. Various winning 
coalitions can be calculated according to the weighted votes in the constituency 
with majority voting (see Brams et al. 1994: 100) and vote-trading (Riker and 
Brams 1973/74). 
   Coalition forming in EU organs is an ongoing process and does not show a 
stable pattern (see IV. 2 below). There are various coalitions possible depending 
on the issue. As a political rule, without the endorsement of Germany and 
France no major development can go ahead (Lodge 1991 :7). Even the German-
French tandem recently deviated from its unity on agricultural policy. A good 
example of using differences among parties within an assembly was the tactics 
applied by the US government toward the EU during the negotiations in the 
Uruguay round (Landau 1996). The US negotiator succeeded in splitting the 
German-French tandem and by forming an alliance with Germany could get its 
position through. 
III. 1. 4. Representativity 
   HYPOTHESIS VI : Decisions are more likely to be stable when an assembly is 
highly representative, consensual and without pressure to decide. The follow up 
costs are usually lower. 
   This hypothesis states the other side of the coin formulated in hypotheses III 
and IV. If an assembly is representative and time is available to discuss exten-
sively, then it can include the major actors with their interests. Consequently, 
the outcome of such negotiations is highly legitimized (Marin 1983: 205) and has 
a tendency to last longer. One of the unique principles of the EU is that it tries 
to create a homogenous pattern of policy representation (Pfetsch 1995: 189). 
The small countries should be able to have their say as much as the poorer and 
the peripheral countries. By equilibrating these various differences and diver-
sities, the EU is attractive also to minor states in terms of power. Otherwise it 
could not be understood why smaller countries like the Benelux-countries are 
among the champions of European integration. 
   So far the decisions initiated by the Commission and taken by the Council
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are fairly stable in the sense that a high proportion of them are implemented in 
the member countries ; they last long since equal representation is the dominant 
principle in EU organisms. Even decisions made with time restraints like those 
on agricultural policy or on the budget show fairly stable results. 
III. 1. 5. Ideological and programmatic orientation 
   HYPOTHESIS VII : The ideological and/or programmatic proximity of orga-
nized member-groups reduces the spectrum of controversial alternatives and leads to 
coalitions. This produces a high consensual potential as a prerequisite for solutions. 
   Ideology can aggregate diverse interests and can serve as a unifier in the 
decision-making process. In parliamentary systems governments are formed on 
the basis of "natural allies" procuring maximum payoffs for the participating 
parties (Dodd 1976: 38). This empirically tested relationship rarely holds in the 
case of EU-parties since they do not possess that coherence observable within 
national constituencies. Nevertheless, some alliances may be formed on the basis 
of ideological vicinities. 
   Party alignments do not play a decisive role in the Council or in the 
Commission or even in the European parliament. In national constituencies 
parties provide a mechanism for co-ordination of policies across levels of 
government or across institutions. Fragmentation is, among others, the result of 
the fact that neither the European Council nor the Council of Ministers possess 
party affiliations as a coordinating instrument. Political parties within the 
European Parliament are aggregations of national parties ; they lack the unity 
required for a more coherent policy. On the executive side the European Council 
and the Council of Ministers are intergovernmental entities separately 
responsible to their national constituencies. What brings them together is a 
common interest in the European project and the advantages that they can 
expect from it in terms of national policy-making. As for the executive and 
legislative bodies of the EU it is argued that the styles and cultures of the 
Commissioners are as important as specific calculations about national 
advantages that might result (Peters 1994). Here, the professional styles and the 
political cultures of the various countries may play a role. It is said that within 
the Brussels apparatus the French administrative traditions are documented by 
the fact that the French language is used more commonly than other languages. 
Externally, however, English is the more commonly used language. 
   Ideology is, therefore, not an important factor. More important factors of 
consensus-building are the common will to build Europe, the visions on the 
Union's finalities which induce certain institutional patterns, the will to secure a 
country's interest in a specific matter, a common economic interest in bigger 
markets (large scale production), and the pressure from outside by globalization-
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processes, among the most important. 
III. 1. 6. Issues 
   HYPOTHESIS VIII: A greater amount of material and conflicting issues 
facilitates compromises and the settlement of controversial issues. Multi-issues 
facilitate compromises. 
   In general, economic goods are accessible to division, diversification and 
differentiation. Quantity and quality, price-cost relations, the factor of time and 
space etc. are opportunities for give-and-take, for package deals, and for 
substitutive and/or compensatory deals (see Sebenius 1991). Even in case of 
indivisible goods, i. e. a good "that cannot be split physically into parts, and 
concerns that cannot be compromised on" (Albin 1991 : 47), there exist a number 
of compensatory and functional strategies to overcome a deadlock in nego-
tiations. Additional issues can be added, resource expansion can facilitate 
solutions. An example is the deal among the Twelve about the site of the central 
bank for the European Union. In the decision about the central bank (which is 
now in Frankfurt) other European institutions like the European Environmental 
Agency (Copenhagen), Europol (Den Haag), European Drugs Agency (London) 
etc. were included and by that other countries got their share. 
   A compromise is facilitated by dealing with divisible goods. This is so 
because, among others, such goods are accessible to a give-and-take and are not 
highly value-loaded. But even in the case of indivisibility and non-negotiable 
interests, i. e. value-loaden goods with symbolic meaning, there are ways of 
compromising through exchange and functional strategies. Cecilia Albin has 
shown that even in the case of the most sensitive good as is the city of Jerusalem, 
there are political functions which can be taken over by Jews and Moslems 
through power sharing (Albin 1991 : 45-76). 
    Since most economic issues are multi-issue by nature, compromises can be 
reached even in such fields as agriculture. The Single European Act was 
presented by Jacques Delors "in large bunches". Other new items on the agenda 
had appeared during the biannual meetings of the heads of the executives since 
each host of such meetings wanted to have major initiatives adopted by his 
colleagues. It is stated that one of the unique features of the EU is its openness 
towards a variety of issues and competing policies, a variety which seems to be 
bigger than on national agendas (Peters 1994: 11,12) 
   This diversity of issues is among others promoted by the various 
commissioners in the Commission. Each one has personal ambitions. 
Commissioners can use activism for reviving their political careers either on the 
national or on the European stage (Peters 1994: 14). The fragmentation of the 
Commission gives room for such maneuvers since the borders of the DGs are not
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always clearly defined. Thus environmental policy falls in the competence of DG 
XI and the 'Euro-Quango' of the European Environmental Agency. But other 
DGs have their say in this policy field like the DG XVI for regional affairs. The 
absence of adequate co-ordination mechanisms known in national governments 
such as party alignments or inter-ministerial bodies leads, on the one hand, to 
more openness for policy initiatives ; on the other hand, it makes the formation 
of a coherent governmental policy difficult. This lack of an "adolescent bureau-
cracy" (Mazey and Richardson 1993) allows an advocate of an attractive issue 
not only to have the issue considered but also to have it considered in a 
particular format by a receptive DG. 
   It is not only by differentiation of issues that negotiations are facilitated, but 
also by a characteristic of the EU. With the increase of numbers of participants 
in EU organs the number of issues increases as well. There are more issues to be 
negotiated than in national constituencies, hence there is an increase in 
negotiatable issues at hand.
III. 2. External conditions 
   Conditions external to the actor determine the negotiation process. We 
understand by this the binding and non-binding character of decisions, the 
pressure exerted on the negotiators, future expectations of action and, foremost, 
the rules and procedures of decision-making. 
III. 2. 1. Binding and non-binding decisions 
   HYPOTHESIS IX: Binding decisions affect the content (substance) and rules of 
the decision process, The more binding decisions are, the more they tend to be 
pragmatic and bundled ; non-binding decisions are more radical and emphasize 
extreme positions. 
   The non-binding nature of decisions leaves the decision-maker with less 
responsibility as to the implementation of the decisions taken. Therefore, radical 
positions can serve as a means to integrate parties on a common platform vis-a-
vis an adversary (Rothstein 1979). Binding decisions force the parties to look out 
for positions which allow their implementation in a later stage. 
   Decisions taken by the Council of Ministers in Brussels can serve as 
examples for the latter, the voting in the General Assembly of the UN as 
examples for the former. The binding nature of decisions is the distinguishing 
feature of the EU compared to other international organizations. Since EU-
"regulations" are binding in their totality
, "directives" in their goals and 
"decisions" in individual cases
, pragmatism prevails and radical positions do not 
get a chance. Only if a member government wants to avoid a decision it might 
use a radical proposal and then veto it.
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III. 2. 2. The degree of pressure on decision-making 
   HYPOTHESIS X : External or internal pressure on the negotiators to produce 
results can either facilitate compromises or harden the positions. 
   Last minute decisions can result from the pressure given by a strict time 
table. The manipulation of the time table, i. e. to stop the clock, as shown during 
negotiations on agrarian policy or in the recent GATT-negotiations, is the last 
resort to reach an agreement in time. This time pressure can be healthy because 
it forces the parties to come to an agreement at all ; without such a pressure no 
resolution may have occurred. External pressure can, however, have a negative 
effect on the negotiating parties in that they react negatively upon such 
pressure. External pressure can also serve as an alibi for a policy. 
   In the EU arena decisions often have to be taken at a certain point in time. 
In debates on agricultural issues or on the budget, time pressure secures to a 
great extent the making of decisions. Pressure on the decision-makers comes 
also from external pressure groups which, as a consequence, may block a 
consensual decision in EU assemblies. Dominant basic values and overarching 
general priorities can compensate such pressure ; this may lead to second best 
solutions for individual countries. 
III. 2. 3. Future scope of action 
   HYPOTHESIS XI : The numeric voting power not always dominates in a system 
of majority voting. Besides pure voting power other considerations of the political 
environment may determine the voting behavior as well, such as future expectations 
(obligations towards an external/foreign power, future coalitions, maneuverability of 
future governments, estimates on future voting behavior etc.). 
   Future expectations play an important role in EU decision-making. The 
securing of support for future actions has often been a consideration for a 
compromise in a present action. The prospect of preventing military quarrels 
among European countries in the future was an important unifier and has so far 
determined the will of European, especially French and German politicians to 
develop interdependent structures. Also, the vision of the future can guide 
negotiators in their actions. A driving force for the development of the European 
Community has always been the will to achieve an integrated ensemble of states. 
In addition the often quoted "shadow of the future" (Axelrod 1984) is a way 
acquainting negotiators with each other, and thus, by forming an esprit de corps, 
decisions are made by customary arrangements. 
III. 2. 4. Rules of decision-making 
   HYPOTHESIS XII: In assemblies of high basic consensus, majority-rule in 
decision-making is a common practice. In highly heterogenous assemblies, unani-
mous decision-making is preferred. The necessity to decide unanimously (even
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unwillingly) increases with the heterogeneity of the assembly. 
   Unanimity as a decision rule gives each member of an assembly a veto 
position and, by this, preserve the member's interests. Majority vote to the 
contrary gives an assembly the right to reach decisions against members. 
Therefore, if an assembly accepts majority vote, this is a sign of greater 
consensus and a basic common denominator. In the EC-discussions in the 1960s 
the six members were not yet prepared to accept qualified majority vote in the 
Council of Ministers ; the Luxembourg compromise (1966) indicated a lack of 
basic understanding. The same unwillingness can be observed in the Security 
Council in the UN. The consensus minus one formula that was introduced later-
on can be seen as one step to enable decision-making in cases against the 
member's own concern. Also it is used in multilateral for that no-votes count as 
abstention but consensus prevails. The same holds for the compromise found in 
1997 at the Amsterdam conference of the EU with the formula « constructive 
abstention > which means that a motion can pass even if one member country 
abstains in the Council of Ministers. 
   The importance of this hypothesis is shown in the discussion to proceed 
from unanimity to the majority voting in the EU-Council. The reluctance by 
some of the member-states to introduce majority voting on issues of high 
politics shows that these countries are not yet prepared to give up their veto 
position ; this is at the same time a cause and a sign of heterogeneity in the EU. 
   HYPOTHESIS XIII: The internal costs of the negotiation process rise when 
decision-making rules approach unanimity ; the external costs will decrease. 
   The rule of unanimity demands more time and effort to produce outcomes 
than majority voting. The year-long negotiations in the different GATT rounds 
or the SALT negotiations show the difficulties in reaching agreements under 
conditions of unanimity. The GATT agreements lasted for the agreed-upon 
period ; the SALT I and II agreements were finalized only after revisions and 
modifications. 
   Countries which favor majority voting do so-among other reasons-in 
order to secure effectiveness and efficiency. In some instances a quick reaction 
is necessary especially in situations of crises. 
   HYPOTHESIS XIV : The rule of unanimity supports outcomes that are oriented 
to the status quo, because a re-distribution of the (unchanged) decision-material 
would disadvantage at least one party. 
   The difficulties in reaching consensus by all participants often reduce the 
field of alternatives to the smallest possible common denominator. The risk of 
change is usually higher than it is for keeping the status quo and, therefore, 
parties can either avoid decisions or propose blue sky formulas (Bachrach &
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Baratz 1963, Fraenkel 1968: 66). Therefore, the tendency to produce conserva-
tive decisions prevails, if everybody has to agree and nobody loses against his 
own will. Likewise, the UN Security Council rarely made decisions against a 
member state when it was involved in a given crisis. 
   Usually, in the fields of high politics the status quo is preserved, and, by that, 
vital interests are guaranteed and disadvantages to one of the member states 
avoided.
IV. INSTRUMENTS
   The use of material and immaterial resources is of strategic importance to 
the purpose and the assertion of interests. These resources cannot be seen apart 
from the above discussed structural conditions. Instruments of decision-making 
and techniques to influence decisions are :
- use of power, influence and leadership capacity, 
- increase of consensual potential through coalitions, 
- setting of quotas and proportions, 
- enlargement or differentiation of subject-matters, 
- exchange or linkage, 
- delay through submission to committees or ratification, 
- escape into generalizations or ideologization.
IV. 1. Power, influence and leadership 
   Hypothesis XV : Power and influence based on resources can determine the 
outcome of negotiations in favor of their user. Unequal distributions of power cause 
struggles among the different groups and are energy consuming. 
   Power and influence of individuals or groups in an assembly are based on 
internal and external sources. Members of representative political assemblies 
rely on their power-base, e. g. the voters, who determine the extent of their 
representation. The clientele of an assembly member is an outer limiting factor 
to his "weight", since not only the backing of his voters but also economic, 
ideological and reputational resources are important. Among the four sources of 
power identified by Crozier that are in the hands of organizations, two can be 
described as outer sources : control of the environment and control of the 
information and communication channels. Inner sources are competence and the 
handling of organizational rules (Crozier/Friedberg 1979: 50). The specific 
office and person are the subjects of power from internal sources. Instruments 
based on power resources may consist of pressure (threats, promises, black-
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mailing, deception) from an external power or from a decision-maker with an 
extremely strong power-base that is exerted on a weaker partner or adversary. 
Such pressure-which also can be used by a weaker party with may-be less 
success-can either force a solution or impede the decision-making. 
   Robert Michels (1989: 46) was among the first who tried to identify the 
sources of leadership in organizations. He differentiated technical-administra-
tive, psychological and intellectual sources. The scheme elite-masses served as 
a base to the iron law of oligarchy. Michels' explanatory model describes 
certainly just one extreme position of an assembly's organization, that is one of 
extreme size that favors the stabilization of the leadership position. Socio-
psychological experiments have shown that groups are not necessarily more 
prone to make decisions than individuals. To the contrary, in order to activate 
a group the courage to take risks must come from a "born leader" (Irle 1971). 
During conferences and meetings one must not underestimate the authority of 
the office itself that is given to the negotiator (discussion leader, president of 
parliament, chairman of the conference) ; he can influence the agenda and the 
outcome of a conference by formal and informal diplomacy, informative 
traveling before the conference, opening speeches, scheduling, convening of the 
conference, deciding on the order of speakers, using the media, drafting the final 
declaration and further use of the procedural and organizational rules (Raven 
1965: 371-382, Kaufmann 1968: 50, 76-79, 83-101). The target to bring the 
conference to a conclusive end demands a refined diplomacy vis-a-vis the group 
members. 
   These techniques are used extensively by the presidents of the EU. Every 
government holding the presidency invests a lot into the half year term for its 
own prestige and the initiation and implementation of political interests and 
visions. Also, a skillful and strong president of the European Commission can 
considerably influence the development of the Union. Strong figures like 
Hallstein and Delors have left their traces, whereas others acted more within the 
Council. Hence, the role of individual politicians with their skill, knowledge, 
visions, endurance, health conditions etc. can certainly be important to the 
decision-making process. In the approaches of rational choice the actor is 
considered as a rational maximizer of his or her utility. The reality of decision-
making in EU organs with a multiplicity of actors and solutions does not 
correspond to that preconceived rational utility acting. "Preferences are 
unstable and uncertain and the decision that something needs to be done often 
creates the preferences rather than vice versa" (Peters 1994: 20). 
   Each assembly has the task to produce results, that is decisions. It is as 
evident as necessary that this needs energy. This energy can be consumed by
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internal struggle and nothing is left for external problem-solving and decision-
making, A more equal distribution of power and influence and, thus, a more 
balanced situation becomes possible when, for example, the chairman and the 
host country are named by a rotation system or when the host country is a 
neutral state. In this case the dominance of one state and his representatives 
cannot originate from organizational or local advantages. 
   Deviances in the numeric size of one party and the subsequent effects on 
decisions can also be explained with the talent and the persuasive power of 
politicians. Decisions can be influenced not only by the authority of an office, 
but also by the authority of an individual. 
   The EU-member states possess different national resources measured by 
size, population, economic capability, military strength, etc. But it is one of the 
characteristics of the community to secure equal representation in the different 
decision-making organisms. This is done by weighing votes, by rotation in 
offices, by equal representation in EU organisms, etc. Whether this principle will 
last in the future is an open question.
IV. 2. Coalition-Building 
   Coalitions are built in order to provide a payoff to each of the participants. 
Every participant will expect a share of the payoffs at least proportional to the 
amount of resources which he contributed to a coalition (Gamson 1961 : 376). 
Also, it is possible that a party as a last-comer or new-comer can get more 
depending on his role in the coalition (see Piker and Brams 1973/74). If the 
payoff is bigger then the better. In the case of the EU this proportionality of 
gains and costs is not put into practice. There are net payers and net 
beneficiaries. The community spirit tries to equalize differences in wealth. 
   For a certain period of time agreements among coalition partners can 
stabilize majority decisions. Such institutionalized coalition-government are 
common in many parliamentary democracies. Specific agreements on certain 
matters, like exchange deals or personal questions, are reached through linkages. 
In the case of the EU, again, there is-with very few examples-no such thing as 
a stable coalition pattern. Nevertheless Helen Wallace has shown that in the 
preparation of the Single Act the French-German tandem played a decisive role 
in the promotion of the Act. On various occasions the relatively stable coalition 
France-Germany contrasted with relatively short-lived coalitions between 
France and Belgium. On the whole the interesting thing about coalition building 
is the observation that there is not one decisive criterion for such a get-together. 
Neither ideological alignments among Social Democrats or among Christian 
Democrats, nor cultural affinities such as among Angle-Saxons or among Latin
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countries, nor common historical experiences (such as former war alliances) 
alone determine the formation of coalitions in the EU. There are rather ad hoc 
alliances such as among the free traders UK, Benelux, Denmark and Germany as 
against the protectionists France, Italy and Greece, or among the environmental 
leaders Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark (together with the three new EU 
states) or the environmental laggards Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and 
Belgium (Sbragia 1996: 238). Other more permanent coalitions arise from the 
global view on Europe's finality. There are on the one hand countries favoring 
a closer European Union with a more federal outlook like Germany, the Benelux, 
Spain, Austria and to a lesser degree Italy and, on the other hand, countries 
favoring loser intergovernmental approaches like the UK, Denmark and to a 
lesser degree France, and Greece. A third category can be added consisting of 
countries with a supranational outlook such as Finland, Greece, Sweden, Ireland, 
Portugal, and to a lesser degree France, Spain, Italy or Denmark. The differences 
determine to a large degree their proposals for the institutional reform of the EU.
IV. 3. Setting of quota and proportions 
   At least theoretically, institutionalized or informal forms of representation 
allow a proportional participation of the most important political and social 
forces (Lehmbruch 1967: 7 ; Nordlinger 1972: 22-24). The weighting of the 
votes in the European Council secures some sort of proportional representation 
of the member countries. In some cases the setting of quota and proportions can 
lead to stable decisions (Hypothesis VI) -though with limited success, because 
of the tensions among heterogenous groups, or, because the quota did not 
include all or some favored groups. 
   The idea of proportional representation finds its expression in a variety of 
forms in all EU-institutions. The representation of all member states is reflected 
in the number of Parliament-seats that are approximately proportional to the 
size of the population ; all member-states are represented in the Commission (the 
bigger countries have two seats) and the weighing of votes is introduced in the 
Council in cases of qualified majority voting. In addition all countries have one 
representative in the Court of Justice and the interest groups of the member 
countries are represented in the Social and Economic Committee. The 
Committee of Regions consists of representatives of states (Lander), regions, 
provinces or municipalities proportional to the size of the member countries. 
These modes of participation with proportional representation protect possible 
minority positions but giving nevertheless a bias in favor of the smaller 
countries and-by way of a veto in cases of unanimity voting or of fixed 
proportions-a quota for individual countries.
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   Another form of quotas consists in fixing a certain quantity or quality to 
commercial goods in the foreign trade. The agreement reached in mid 1996 by 
the EU culture ministers on a system of quotas on television productions is an 
example of that sort. The nonbinding character and the exemption of new 
services of the accord reflects a compromise between the French-led supporters 
of tougher quotas and quota opponents led by Britain and Germany.
IV. 4. Enlargement or Differentiation of the Sub j ect-matter 
   The enlargement of the subject-matter to be decided through addition or 
exchange can lead to consensual solutions (Hypothesis VIII). In the same way, 
parts of a package deal can be excluded or declared non-consensual (see III. 2. 4). 
An example is the argument of "vital interests" in the EC's Luxembourg 
compromise. Another common way to differentiate an unspecified item, like oil 
or wages, is to split it up in parts (oil : quantity, quality, kind) or add specifics 
(wages : additional wage costs). Thus, a conclusion can be reached, like price-
fixing or wage-increase (see Rothstein 1979 ; Pfetsch 1987: 269/270).
IV. 5. Exchange or linkage 
   Further means to promote acceptable settlements of opposing interests are 
exchange and linkage (see Hypothesis VIII and III. 1. 6). In the US, log-rolling as 
a type of exchange is a technique of an alliance of specific singular interests that 
otherwise are not acceptable to a majority (see Breyer 1981). An older strategy 
of conflict regulation is the coupling of two matters and/or offices ; this was a 
tradition in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire ; in today's Republic of Austria it 
was possible to exchange the foreign ministry post against the increase in milk 
prices. In the FRG, the NATO double-track resolution can be seen as a rather 
peculiar variant of a supposed coupling. The linkage techniques are rather 
common in EU-negotiations, Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) show how issue 
linkage can enhance co-operation and examples from the European Community, 
the Common Agricultural Policy, and the European Monetary System. The 
agreement of one particular country to a proposal from others can be linked to 
compensations in other fields. Especially the peripheral countries like Ireland, 
Portugal or Greece link their pro-European engagements to their share of the 
structural or cohesion funds. Another example is the negotiation of the single 
market where vertical measures for particular products were linked to 
horizontal measures such as the right of establishment (see H. Wallace & A. R. 
Young in H. and W. Wallace 1996: 150).
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IV. 6. Delay 
   In the process of decision-making there is always the danger of missing the 
target, of driving into a dead end or encountering a tension-loaded atmosphere. 
In these cases a transfer to committees is often necessary to cool down the 
temper, to win time or to update information. Another means of breaking a 
dead-lock is a reference to further regulating and executing laws. This often 
happens during negotiations of constitutional drafts or rules which need further 
specifications in the future. This strategy could mean a way out of a dead-lock 
where there exists an unwillingness to decide. Delays in the Community are 
often results of a not (yet) existing consensus in a particular policy field. I. e. 
when Jacques Delors took office as President of the European Commission he 
visited all the capitals of the member-states in order to find out possible fields of 
action. As a result he postponed foreign and security policies and concentrated 
on the Economic and Monetary Union as well as on financial issues (Delors plan 
I and II). 
   The setting of a time table is another form of delaying political programmes. 
A time schedule is on the one hand half-binding on the actors and on the other 
hand it gives opportunities to revise and modify policy plans according to 
changing conditions. Thus the schedule for the Currency Union with its 
requirements and conditions for the transition phases provides open delays or 
non-compliance. Something similar happened in the seventies when the Werner 
plan, which foresaw the realization of a Monetary Union already for the 1970s 
and 1980s, was not put into practice.
IV. 7. Escape into generalizations or ideologization 
   The escape into non-binding generalizations or radical ideologization is one 
form of avoiding a decision on a specific and concrete item (see III. 2. 1). The item 
can be disguised behind ideological phrasing (sometimes called political or 
"blue-sky" propositions) ; seen from the actor's position, the advantage of 
ideological catchwords is their wide-range appeal to everyone without 
mentioning a specific item. In this way, problematic re-distributions are avoided 
and a heterogenous assembly can continue to operate and demonstrate its unity 
to the outside.
V. COSTS AND BENEFITS
   Decision-making processes produce costs that increase with the size of the 
assembly (Hypothesis III), though the external risks may diminish accordingly 
(Hypothesis III). The procedural and organizational rules, too, may influence an
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assembly's running costs and/or additional costs later on. Internally, unanimous 
decision-making is cost-intensive, but it is low in additional costs afterwards. 
Majority decision-making is less cost-intensive in producing decisions, but may 
cause higher costs with regard to external risks (Hypothesis XIII). Another 
feature of the size of assemblies is the respective value of each vote. The value 
will decrease when the number of members increases (Hypothesis II). 
   In the case of the EU it has been said that negotiations cannot be understood 
in the light of rational choice approaches (Keck 1995, Schneider 1994, Allan 
1984). Neither can we start from the basis of fixed preferences nor are rational 
cost-benefit calculations the basis of the establishment of procedures and EU 
institutions. Rather a more holistic approach such as the social communication 
theory seems to be appropriate to understand and explain negotiation processes 
in the EU and with its outside world (see Habermas 1982, Muller 1994).
VI. OUTCOMES
   After having dealt with the independent variables, i. e. the conditions and 
the instruments of the decision-making process in assemblies, we are now 
dealing with the dependent variable, i. e. the outcome of the decision-making 
process. We will be dealing with the objectives, the assembly performance, and 
the outcomes of assembly processes. Outcome variables are non-decisions, 
partial decisions, radical decisions, ambiguous decisions, stable decisions, 
conservative or progressive decisions, future oriented decisions. 
   The analysis of decision processes has revealed a multitude of dependencies 
between the independent variables "framework" and "means" on the one hand, 
and the dependent variables "value of decisions" and "costs" on the other hand. 
Different parts of the framework may influence each other, or, depending on the 
subject-matter, means and framework are exchangeable. Dependent and 
independent variables may also have reversible relations. A theory of decision-
making with a wider range cannot indicate the goals or, in general, the 
performance of assemblies in any material way, but only specify their formal 
aspects. The assemblies that are analyzed here all have the common feature of 
coming from different positions and wanting to produce a common policy; 
assemblies that are convened only to discuss or clarify certain points of view are 
not included. Structural conditions and the use of means can support or hamper 
the following assembly performances.
VI. 1. Non-decisions 
   The non-decision on a material item can be one of the results of a decision-
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making process. A decision on non-decision can result from a very heterogenous 
group with highly dissenting interests, or it is an intended strategy to avoid 
unfavorable results. Both considerations played a role during the period of the 
empty chair in the 1960s by France. Or a veto against a proposal can express a 
general opposition on the part of one country like nowadays in the case of Great 
Britain as a revenge for the sanctions on the export of British beef. The potential 
for consensual solutions increases with the ideological or programmatic 
proximity of the different groups (Hypothesis VII) or with larger packages, that 
is with more subject-matter to decide on. Internal or external pressure can 
accelerate or delay a decision (Hypotheses X and XI). Compromises become more 
likely when the groups estimate that a matter in the future (e. g. participation in 
a coalition government, campaigning) is more important than an actual topic 
(Hypothesis XI). The level of consensus is an equally important aspect of 
decisions on regulations for elections and voting. A high basic consensus 
facilitates majority decisions ; divergent interests favor an unanimous decision 
(Hypothesis XII). Deadlocks in the decision process can be broken by delay or 
adjournment. One way of deferring a matter is its transfer to committees. In 
such committees experts can produce and handle more information. 
   Thus one important technique of political actors is to create non-decisions 
when decisions might be inimical to their interests. Such a technique is secured 
by the principle of unanimity in the various policy-making bodies of the EU 
foremost on issues of high politics. The Community gives many examples of this 
strategy like the numerous plans, proposals, reports produced by special 
committees for the further development of the Community. Most of them 
became obsolete shortly after their publication like the Fouchet plans in the 
1960s; others became concrete policies like the Werner or the Delors plans. Also 
social programmes are very unpopular with a substantial number of influential 
EU-members, and whenever they are put on the agenda they run the risk of 
being cut back or even cut out.
VI. 2. Partial decisions 
   A solution can cover the entire subject-matter or just parts of it (partial 
decision). Broad decisions can be reached through enlargement and differen-
tiation (Hypothesis VIII) or exchange and linkage. Partial decisions can 
symbolize the lowest common denominator in cases of sharp differences in 
opinions among member governments. Scharpf (1988) holds that in the EU as 
well as in federal systems countervailing forces among actors at the various 
levels of decision-making create a so-called "decision-trap" (Entscheidungsfalle). 
This implies an inability to move to more progressive visions and a tendency to
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stick with conservative solutions. Peters (1994) argues that the opposite could 
be true. Because of its openness-and I would like to add because of its elite 
structure-the EU can channel demands from social groups more easily than in 
the case of national constituencies. "The fragmentation of the institutions and 
the multiple points of access permit policy entrepreneurs within the EC to have 
the system consider a wide range of options" (Peters 1994: 24).
VI. 3. Radical resolutions 
   A non-binding general statement, that is a non-binding radicalization or 
ideologization, can also be the answer when highly heterogenous groups strug-
gle to reach binding material decisions (Hypothesis IX). Pragmatic solutions are 
common when the assembly is forced to reach a binding solution. The particular 
structure of the EU does not allow radical solutions but rather pragmatic ones 
(see III. 1. 4.).
VI. 4. Ambiguous decisions 
   Decision-making processes may also produce a choice of options when there 
is no need for binding decisions (ambiguous decision). The result will be realistic 
and pragmatic recommendations (Hypothesis IX) unless this situation leads to 
empty phrases, irresponsible demands or over-generalizations. Compromises 
are also ambiguous decisions, since they account for both sides and can, thus, be 
interpreted in different ways. The diverting interests of EU actors in policy 
matters can in some instances only be brought together by this form of decision 
formula. It could be the minimum consensual platform for otherwise diverting 
interests.
VI. 5. Majority decisions and compromise 
   An outcome either reflects just the numeric majority or it includes minority-
positions. Majority positions are successfully implemented when the majority is 
not forced to compromise ; minorities have their chance to influence the decision 
process when the majority party is split or a big party has no absolute majority 
and needs a small party as its coalition-partner (Hypothesis V). 
   A fairly large assembly under time pressure favors the majority positions 
compared to smaller assemblies without time pressure (Hypothesis IV). 
According to the EU-community law the majority rule must be applied on 
specified issues, especially on the common market and on not so common fields 
as foreign and security policies. In reality, however, even in these fields a 
consensual approach is preferred to majority voting.
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VI. 6. Stable and Unstable Decisions 
   Decisions are either stable in time or they must be revised, rejected or 
modified. The stability of decisions depends on a great number of factors. As a 
tendency, decisions are stable when they have been reached without time or 
power pressure (Hypothesis IV), with a high consensus (Hypothesis VI), on the 
basis of unanimous decision-making (Hypothesis XIII and XIV), or with respect 
to the further scope of action (Hypothesis XI). Representativity alone, e. g. with 
fixed quota, does not suffice, unless there is a high consensual potential, e. g. 
through ideological or programmatic proximity among the organized members 
(Hypothesis VII and IV. 3). Those coalition governments with a barely sufficient 
majority have shown to be relatively stable. In the EU the practice of voting 
follows a pattern of consensus and is not a "tyranny of the majority". This is 
caused by the expectation of other more stable decisions in the future.
VI. 7. Conservative or Progressive Decisions 
   Decisions reached in a group process are either aimed at the preservation of 
the status quo or at initiating change. Unanimous decision-making favors 
status quo-oriented decisions (Hypothesis XIV) ; majority decision-making is 
more flexible and holds more options for change. Thus countries like Germany, 
the Benelux countries, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain that are willing to 
deepen or/and widen the EU favor qualified majority voting in the Council in 
the field of foreign and security policies (as well as in other policy fields like that 
of the Judice and Home Affairs). Those countries reluctant or even refraining 
from the integration process like the UK, Denmark or Ireland want to keep 
unanimity voting. Thus, the preservation of a veto position can prevent neces-
sary changes and stabilize the status quo. 
   However, in EU assemblies both types of outcomes are possible and the 
result does, of course, not only depend on the rules of the game. Political will is 
the decisive factor and where there is a will there is a way, which could result in 
a change of the rules. In the EU there are numerically more conservative 
governments like the British and the Danish who want to preserve national 
competencies as much as possible. Others expect a federal European state and 
are, therefore, prepared to concede more competencies to a third level 
organization such as the EU.
VI. 8. Future-oriented Decisions 
   Last, but not least, solutions of a decision-making process can refer to a 
future matter or a current topic. Negotiations among coalition partners over a 
future government participation or electoral campaigns require the will to 
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compromise (Hypothesis XI). Instead of short term gains the agents may prefer 
a long term benefit. Gains in the long run may engage short term costs. 
   Many decisions in EU organisms can be seen in this perspective. It could be 
that actors agree with a party because he wants the other's consent in future 
negotiations. It could also be that the vision of a future Europe directs the 
actions of its members.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
   At the beginning of this paper we asked questions about the specific nature 
of EU-negotiation processes and how they influence the outcome. The 
emphasize was mainly on two very important aspects of EU policy, namely the 
representativity of the member countries in the various bodies and the efficiency 
and effectiveness in producing outcomes. These two aspects are connected to 
the two additional issues, namely the deepening and the widening of the EU. 
   Our analysis has shown that there are, on the one hand, general theoretical 
statements covering the negotiation processes as a whole and, on the other hand, 
very specific characteristics of each of the EU assemblies. 
   With regard to more general observations, we mentioned some of the 
unifying forces which keep diversities, fragmentations and segmentations 
together. The community spirit, the community institutions, the leadership of 
the Commissioners, the will to construct Europe and to intensify and widen the 
political arenas in terms of policy fields and members-all these driving forces 
have so far influenced negotiations in EU-bodies which, most of the time, have 
led to consensus and have worked through ups and downs toward further 
integration. 
   With regard to the specifics of the negotiation and decision-making 
processes in the various EU-bodies, some of the differences must be mentioned. 
Since the assemblies vary in size (i. e. 15 members in the Council or 16 in the 
Court of Justice), in their modes of representation, in their structure and their 
voting procedures, etc., we can hardly draw general conclusions that describe 
and/or explain outcomes. However, as to our initial question about differences 
between negotiations within the community institutions and the inter-
governmental organs of the EU, we can draw some conclusions since they are 
structured differently. Assemblies which practice the community method show 
more evolution than intergovernmental assemblies. This may be due to the fact 
that qualified majority voting allows more dynamics and the process can be 
geared more effectively by the supranational organisms. Intergovernmental 
cooperation with unanimity voting has the tendency of preserving the status
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quo. Also, economic goods can be negotiated more easily with multiple tech-
niques than issues of high politics with more national values. Whereas the 
former type of negotiation mainly deals with interest conflicts, the latter deals 
with value conflicts. Hence, we can explain the different outcomes of negotia-
tions in the community and the intergovernmental bodies with their different 
structural and procedural conditions. Community institutions have a tendency 
to produce change, intergovernmental bodies to produce more conservative 
outcomes. Hence, institutions matter and different institutions matter different-
ly.
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